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The WTO Cotton Case and
US Domestic Policy
By Darren Hudson, C. Parr Rosson III, John Robinson, and Jaime Malaga
Once in a while, an event comes along that portends to
reshape agricultural policy. Brazil’s complaint in the World
Trade Organization (WTO) against the United States on
domestic support for cotton, export credit guarantees, and
export subsidies could be one such event. (For background
on the WTO, the dispute resolution process, and the spe-
cifics of the cotton case, see the Economic Research Ser-
vice, http://www.ers.usda.gov/briefing/wto/, and Mercier,
2004). The initial ruling, however, was a mixed bag. The
WTO dispute resolution panel did rule in favor of Brazil
on most key points, and the appellate body report,
released March 3, 2005, mostly confirmed the initial
panel’s rulings. The result of both  could have serious
implications for US farm policy.
The cotton case, or Dispute Settlement (DS) 267, has
received considerable national and international attention.
Whereas most agricultural issues (with the exception of
bovine spongiform encephalopathy [BSE]) are, at best, rel-
egated to the business section of the newspaper, the cotton
case has been front-page news. Many popular press publi-
cations, including The New York Times and The Wall Street
Journal, have made the case that the US government has
exploited subsistence farmers around the world by lavish-
ing subsidies on US cotton farmers. US cotton interests
and some farm organizations have countered that as the
2002 farm bill was being developed, assurances were given
to US policy makers that the farm bill provisions were
compliant with WTO rules. In the world of international
trade policy, however, nothing is assured. Many provisions
within agreements are subject to interpretation. Here, we
attempt to draw out the key complaints, findings, and eco-
nomic arguments underlying the case and explore some
implications for future directions in US farm policy.
The Key Complaints
To be successful, Brazil first had to establish that US subsi-
dies exceeded agreed-upon limitations set in 1992. Brazil
successfully argued that US production flexibility contract
payments (PFCPs) and direct payments (DPs) were not
eligible to be classified in the non-trade-distorting Green
Box category due to planting restrictions on fruits and veg-
etables. The 1996 and 2002 Farm Bills restrict planting of
fruits and vegetables on base acres,1 which, the Brazilians
argued, effectively ties direct payments to current produc-
tion. The WTO panel ruled in favor of Brazil on this
point, meaning that PFCPs and DPs were counted as
Amber Box for this case. This finding, along with several
others, meant that the United States had exceeded agreed-
upon 1992 subsidy limits and was not entitled to Peace
Clause protection, thus opening the door for Brazil to
argue the remainder of its complaints. However, more
importantly, this seemingly innocuous technical point
may have more major long-run implications for US policy,
which we discuss later in this article.
Brazil challenged four primary components of US
agricultural policy. First, US domestic support for cotton
causes “serious prejudice”2 to Brazilian producers by
depressing or suppressing the world price of cotton and
results in a larger US share of the world cotton market.
Second, US export credit guarantees are an export subsidy.
Third, the Step 2 payments are both an export subsidy and
an import substitution policy.3 Finally, tax credits/deferrals
given for cotton to US exporters amount to an export sub-
1. Specifically, planting fruits and vegetables on base acres 
affects payments.
2. Serious prejudice occurs when a subsidy (a) displaces or 
impedes exports or imports, (b) results in significant price 
undercutting, suppression, or lost sales, or (c) results in an 
increase in the subsidizing country’s market share.144 CHOICES 2nd Quarter 2005 • 20(2)
sidy. The United States attempted to
limit the scope of the complaint to
cotton, but Brazil successfully argued
to include all other commodities in
the argument related to export credit
programs as well.
Ultimately, many of Brazil’s
claims hinged on the assertion that
US cotton policies bestow excessive
subsidies and depress world prices.
This claim is important from a pub-
lic relations perspective, because it is
consistent with claims made by inter-
national watchdog groups (such as
Oxfam and others) that US farm pol-
icy depresses world prices and has
had significant adverse consequences
for subsistence farmers in developing
and less developed countries, where
approximately 75% of the world’s
cotton is grown.4 The United States
provided some evidence that cotton
prices actually increased by nearly
100% from 2001 to 2003, which
hardly makes for good evidence of
price depression. Further, a study by
Texas Tech University in January
2004, using a world textile/cotton
model, concluded that the elimina-
tion of all cotton subsidies by the
United States will cause a short-term
international cotton price increase of
only 2.14% and that the price effects
of such policy will quickly dissipate
as other countries increase their pro-
duction (Pan, Mohanty, Ethridge, &
Fadiga, 2005).
Key Findings
Given the Peace Clause determina-
tion mentioned above, the WTO
panel ruled on each claim in Brazil’s
case.5 First, the panel found that
export credit guarantees were export
subsidies. For unscheduled commod-
ities such as cotton and soybeans,
these export subsidies are prohibited
and must be removed. For scheduled
commodities such as rice, the panel
found that export credit guarantees
were subsidies; inclusion of these in
subsidy calculations meant that the
United States had exceeded subsidy
limits in several of the years in ques-
tion. Despite this finding, however,
the panel found that guarantees for
both scheduled and unscheduled
commodities did not constitute cir-
cumvention of US WTO reduction
commitments. Additionally, the
panel found that Brazil had failed to
establish that tax credits to exporters
were export subsidies.
Most importantly, the WTO
panel found that key elements of the
1996 and 2002 farm programs, such
as the marketing loan, countercycli-
cal payments, market loss assistance,
and Step 2, caused significant price
suppression and serious prejudice to
Brazil over the 1999–2002 period.
However, the panel failed to find
compelling evidence that US support
programs would cause serious preju-
dice over the 2003–2007 period.
Conversely, the panel found that
other support programs, such as pro-
duction flexibility contract payments,
direct payments, and crop insurance,
did not cause serious prejudice to
Brazil. Interestingly, the panel did
not rule on the issue of market share,
because it could not agree on a suffi-
cient definition of market share.
Step 2 payments to domestic
users of cotton were ruled to be sub-
sidies that favor the use of US cotton
over imported goods. Step 2 pay-
ments to exporters are subsides con-
tingent upon export performance
and are therefore inconsistent with
WTO rules. The Step 2 provisions
must be modified or eliminated by
July 1, 2005 for the United States to
comply with obligations in the
WTO. The Step 2 program has long
been a popular tool in the US cotton
program. However, from the WTO
ruling one can clearly see that the
Step 2 program has been successfully
targeted by Brazil and must be signif-
icantly changed to remain in compli-
ance.
In sum, the WTO panel found
sufficient evidence to call for an
immediate end to export credit guar-
antees (in their present form) and the
Step 2 payments. The panel further
found that these subsidies, or the
effects of these subsidies, caused seri-
ous prejudice to Brazil and must be
eliminated. Interestingly, however,
the panel did not provide an indica-
tion of the degree of serious prejudice
(i.e., the magnitude of the economic
damage). Thus, the original ruling
suggests that there are many issues
related to US domestic agricultural
3. The Step 2 payment is part of a 
three-step competitiveness program 
for US cotton. Because US cotton is 
often higher priced than world 
market prices, the Step 2 program 
paid the difference between world 
prices and US prices to both export-
ers and domestic users (we are, of 
course, simplifying the mechanics). 
The contention is that this program 
allowed exporters to sell cotton at 
prices consistent with world market 
prices and allowed domestic users to 
purchase US cotton at world mar-
ket prices.
4. This amount is the percentage of 
world production outside of the 
United States, Australia, and the 
European Union.
5. The panel ruled on all major points 
except for the issue of increased 
market share. The lack of a ruling 
on increased market share is imma-
terial because it was ultimately not 
necessary for Brazil’s case. There 
were numerous rulings and findings 
in the case, but we focus on the key 
elements here for clarity.2nd Quarter 2005 • 20(2) CHOICES 145
policy that are to be considered in the
future if the United States wishes to
r e m a i n  i n  c o m p l i a n c e  w i t h  W T O
rules.
Both the United States and Brazil
appealed different parts of the deci-
sion, but the appellate findings,
released on March 3, 2005, upheld
most of the relevant points in the ini-
tial panel’s findings. Although some
provisions of US farm policy will
need to be changed in order to com-
ply with the rulings, the implications
for other program components are
less clear—the panel provided no real
guidance as to what must be changed
or how it must be changed to be in
compliance.
Policy Options and Consequences
There are a number of options avail-
able to the United States as a result of
this decision. First, the United States
can bring farm policy into full com-
pliance with the rulings of the WTO.
This approach requires some modifi-
cation of the export credit guarantee
and Step 2 programs by July 1, 2005,
with other programs to be addressed
in the near future. If Brazil is satisfied
with the July 1 outcome, the process
will end. However, if Brazil believes
the United States has not complied
with the ruling, Brazil can request the
formation of a compliance panel,
which will reexamine the steps taken
by the United States. Thus, whatever
is done by the United States must be
accepted by Brazil and is subject to
WTO review.
Second, the United States can
partially comply by modifying some
policies and compensating Brazil for
maintaining other selected policies.
The United States could comply with
part of the ruling—Step 2 and export
credit guarantee modifications, for
example—but arbitrate with Brazil
over compensation for marketing
loan payments and countercyclical
payments. This option would no
doubt cause some countries to be less
than satisfied, might undermine the
effectiveness of the WTO, and could
delay or derail progress in the Doha
round of WTO negotiations cur-
rently underway. Brazil could impose
tariffs, not necessarily on cotton or
agricultural products, in amounts
consistent with damages caused by
the US policies.6 Brazil is not obli-
gated to place tariffs and must gain
approval from the WTO for products
and tariff rates. Although the WTO
encourages that like products be
dutied, this suggestion is not a
requirement—possibly opening the
door to industrial goods.
Finally, the United States could
opt not to comply at all with the
decision, in which case Brazil will be
allowed to retaliate by imposing
punitive tariffs on Brazilian imports
of US products. Although this
approach would reduce some US
exports, imposing punitive tariffs
would also raise the cost of imports
to Brazilian consumers. More impor-
tant, however, this option would
almost certainly undermine the effec-
tiveness of the WTO, reduce the
ability of the United States to lead
trade liberalization efforts, and stall
or completely negate progress in
Doha. If the United States took the
position of complete noncompliance,
Brazil would be more likely to seek
compensation, because Brazil would
view the US position as inflexible
(not to mention illegal according to
WTO rules).
Is Compliance the Likely 
Outcome?
There are at least three reasons for
the United States to comply with the
WTO rulings. First, as stated above,
compliance sends a clear signal that
the United States still intends to lead
the trade liberalization agenda, thus
providing substantial support to the
Doha Development Agenda in the
WTO negotiations. In fact, cursory
observation of past WTO cases
involving the United States suggests
that the United States tends to com-
ply with WTO rulings. Second, with
respect to the Peace Clause determi-
nation, the United States is vulnera-
ble to further litigation in cotton
now that it has been established that
subsidy reduction commitments were
exceeded.7 Although compliance will
not completely insulate US farm pro-
grams from further litigation, com-
pliance may make arguments of
serious prejudice violations less valid
6. Given the WTO panel’s reluctance 
to provide an estimate of the eco-
nomic damages in its initial ruling, 
these would have to be determined 
before tariffs could be placed. This 
begs the question of just how large 
the damages actually are. If one 
takes the Pan et al. (2005) study at 
face value, it would appear that the 
economic damages are relatively 
small (around 3%).
7. It should be noted that because the 
Peace Clause expired in 2003, all 
countries can now move straight to 
arguments about serious prejudice 
in other commodities without 
establishing Peace Clause violations 
first. The critical element here is 
that because the WTO panel 
deemed many US programs as trade 
distorting, they may have set a pre-
cedent that encourages other coun-
tries to seek remedy in the WTO. 
That process is very expensive, how-
ever, which may limit the number 
of suits brought against the United 
States.146 CHOICES 2nd Quarter 2005 • 20(2)
Figure 1. US agricultural exports to Brazil, 2004.
and nearly moot in multilateral nego-
tiations.
Perhaps a more compelling rea-
son is the potential for retaliatory tar-
iffs. Figure 1 shows that cotton is the
largest US agricultural export to Bra-
zil. Of course, Brazil may choose to
place tariffs on US cotton if compli-
ance is not offered. However, as Fig-
ure 2 shows, agriculture is only a
small portion of overall exports to
Brazil, and Brazil is not obliged to
place tariffs on cotton. In computers,
for example, even a small tariff on
this high-volume, low-margin indus-
try could significantly damage US
sales.
Brazil likely does not want to
increase consumer prices by placing
tariffs on key consumer goods. More-
over, political pressure from poten-
tially affected industries in the
United States will likely mount as
well. Thus, US compliance seems the
most likely course of action.
Conclusions
The WTO case has focused attention
and debate on the future direction of
US farm policy. Although budgetary
pressures have been mounting, Con-
gress has so far not taken action to
reduce the overall level of support to
US agriculture, but farm program
payments are seen as vulnerable
nonetheless (Conley, 2005). At the
same time, some farm groups (such
as the National Corn Growers Asso-
ciation) have signaled a desire to
move from supporting farm incomes
to providing incentives for value-
added product production (Tolman,
2005). The budgetary path in the
short run is uncertain, but the WTO
decision has provided ammunition
for proponents of farm subsidy
reductions and has provided longer-
term political cover for politicians
who would like to reduce farm sup-
port for budgetary or other reasons.
The WTO decision will not
likely lead to a reduction in the over-
all level of farm program payments
by itself, but may lead to a diversion
out of traditional commodity pay-
ments into programs that can be
deemed non-trade-distorting. If the
United States is successful in arguing
for a continuation of the Blue Box
program in the Doha Development
Agenda of trade negotiations and can
move programs such as the PFCPs
and countercyclical payments into
that category, it will solve the short-
term problem of Amber Box subsidy
limit violations. However, any nego-
tiated reductions in the aggregate
measure of support (AMS) in the
Doha Round will necessarily lead to
overall reductions in total support.
Any AMS reduction does not derive
directly from the cotton case, but the
Figure 2. US product exports to Brazil, 2004.
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findings of the cotton case certainly
draw direct attention to the level of
domestic support in the United
States.
One clear signal sent by the
results of DS 267 is that safety-net
programs employing countercyclical
components are under close scrutiny
and likely to be unacceptable in the
future. If this is the case, the counter-
cyclical programs could be chal-
lenged by other countries and for
other crops, even if these programs
are modified and survive. This find-
ing also raises the question of
whether countercyclical payments
will be allowed in the new Blue Box
being negotiated in the Doha Devel-
opment Agenda noted above.
The WTO looms large in the
next fall bill debate. Although some
farm groups are attempting to down-
play the potential impact of the
WTO cotton ruling on the future of
farm policy, one must question how
Congress will be able to ignore com-
pliance issues and the costs of non-
compliance as a new farm policy is
formulated. Clearly, export subsidies
will have to be eliminated, and
export programs of any kind will be
closely scrutinized to ensure compli-
ance. More important is the fate of
farm program payments. The US
Trade Representative has clearly
linked reductions in domestic sup-
port to market access to developing
country markets in the Doha negoti-
ations. Given that the United States
is currently at or near agreed-upon
subsidy limits in the current WTO,
any additional reductions in the
AMS negotiated through the Doha
Round will necessitate overall reduc-
tions in farm program payments.
Thus, discussion of which “box” pay-
ments go into may become only an
interesting sideline discussion, with
the more relevant issue being the
total payments received by farmers.
US farm policy is formed in a
dynamic setting. Agriculture is
becoming an ever-shrinking share of
the US federal budget; demographic
trends make the population further
removed from the farm and rural life.
As international problems and goals
consume more time and money, agri-
culture will increasingly become the
residual claimant for federal
resources. Agriculture may increas-
ingly become the carrot for the
United States to use in trade negotia-
tions, because agriculture is a larger
relative share of the economy of
developing and less developed coun-
tries.
Although US agricultural tariffs
are already among the world’s lowest,
its trade-distorting domestic farm
support ranks near the top, along
with the European Union and Japan.
The farm programs of all three coun-
tries may be targets of challenge in
the future. A successful conclusion to
the Doha Round would likely miti-
gate this outcome, whereas failure in
Doha will almost certainly ensure a
future fraught with litigation.
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